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Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009). 
 
Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives presents an impressive and 
well-developed argument for changing the current elements for prov-
ing copyright infringement.1  Currently, the elements of the plaintiff’s 
cause of action largely follow the tort of trespass to land: volitional en-
try (for land) or volitional copying (for copyright) gives rise to liability 
regardless of proof of harm and without any need for the plaintiff to 
prove the defendant acted unreasonably.  Many scholars have criti-
cized copyright law for following the strict liability model of real-
property trespass,2 and have suggested alternatives that would more 
resemble conditional causes of action3 such as unfair competition, nui-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 2 See, e.g., Stanley F. Birch, Copyright Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative, The 36th An-
nual Donald C. Brace Lecture (Nov. 1, 2006), in 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 147 n.22 
(2007) (outlining three weaknesses of the property analogy); Christina Bohannan, Copyright 
Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 974–76, 983–85 (2007) (criticizing 
the use of trespass-to-land models in copyright); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Pat-
ent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 469–89 (2004) (examining how the differing composition of 
intangible goods can affect information costs: for some things stricter liability can be "an informa-
tion-cost reducing strategy," id. at 511, while for others, such liability can "impose information 
costs on individuals past the point of diminishing marginal returns," id. at 488). 
 3 One model of conditional rather than strict liability is nuisance law.  See Christopher M. 
Newman, Infringement As Nuisance (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09–
17, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354110.  Another alternative is to strengthen the 
fair use doctrine and require proof of “harm” before fair use would be denied.  See Bohannan, 
supra note 2.  Professor Christina Bohannan, like Balganesh, has argued that “foreseeable harm” 
needs to play a much larger role in copyright law.  However, unlike Balganesh, Bohannan sees 
many courts as already using a harm-based model and focuses on the fair use doctrine rather than 
on reformulating the plaintiff’s cause of action.  Another such model is the law of unjust enrich-
ment, also known as restitution.  For an exploration of restitution as a model for regulating the 
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sance, or negligence.4  Professor Shyamkrishna Balganesh makes a 
strong contribution to this school of thought, arguing that copyright 
plaintiffs should be required to prove foreseeability.  In this short Es-
say, I will suggest some new reasons why there might be good reasons 
why the tort of copyright infringement should indeed be reformulated 
to abandon the trespass-to-land model, and explore some of the merits 
and shortcomings of Balganesh’s own version of the revised tort. 
I.  WHY COPYRIGHT IS DIFFERENT FROM LAND OWNERSHIP: 
INTRODUCING A HARM-BENEFIT HYPOTHESIS 
As mentioned, the real-property tort known as trespass makes  
any volitional boundary crossing unlawful.  Boundary crossings that 
have not been consented to are actionable even if the trespasser has a 
socially beneficial use in mind, and even if in good faith he reasonably 
believes he has permission to be on the land.  Admittedly, trespass is 
subject to defenses such as necessity (such as docking at a stranger’s 
island to save one’s life when a storm suddenly threatens).5  Neverthe-
less, boundary crossings that are socially desirable are often not privi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
copying of intangibles, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and 
the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Restitutionary Im-
pulse].  For a recent thought experiment of my own on increasing the extent to which copyright 
follows a negligence model, see Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote Address, Harmless Use: Gleaning from 
Fields of Copyrighted Works (Oct. 31, 2008), in 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2411, 2414–35 (2009) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Harmless Use].  I call the work a thought experiment because its recommen-
dations are based on assumptions that would require empirical verification. 
 4 Copyright and negligence already serve as partial mirror images of each other: Copyright 
seeks to internalize benefits and incentivize plaintiffs toward socially desirable production.  Neg-
ligence seeks to internalize harms and incentivize defendants away from undesirable behavior.  
Both fields also have concerns with the incentives of the “other” actors.  Negligence law seeks to 
make plaintiffs more careful (reduce moral hazard) by making plaintiffs prove negligence and by 
giving defendants defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory or comparative negli-
gence.  Copyright law seeks to encourage defendants to build on predecessor works by both limit-
ing the plaintiffs’ rights and providing defenses. 
  Both bodies of law also embed foreseeability into their torts.  The tort of negligence puts a 
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the harm done was foreseeable to a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s position.  The fair use doctrine within copyright encourages defendants to show that 
their use causes no significant harm to markets that the plaintiff expected to exploit.  That is, the 
defendant might try to show that if his use has any negative impact, it affects only markets un-
foreseeable to plaintiffs.  On the general question of negligence and copyright parallels, see gener-
ally Gordon, Harmless Use, supra note 3, at 2424 n.55 (outlining the major mirror-image 
relations); and Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright As Tort Law’s Mirror Image: “Harms,” “Benefits,” 
and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003). 
 5 Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908) (upholding the sufficiency of a complaint seeking 
damages against a landowner for injuries resulting when the defendant’s servant unmoored the 
boat of a young family that had sought shelter from a storm on the defendant’s island); see also 
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding that staying attached to 
dock after permission is withdrawn may be permitted under the doctrine of necessity, but neces-
sity does not excuse the boat owner from the obligation to pay for any harm caused). 
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leged; rather, they give rise to liability.6  Copyright law has a broader 
“necessity” privilege (we call it the doctrine of “fair use”7) and contains 
an extensive set of detailed exceptions and limits, including a dur-
ational term limit.  But for subsisting copyrights, the cause of action 
known as “copyright infringement” possesses much the same structure 
as does trespass to land: any volitional copying of a substantial and 
copyrightable portion of another’s work is infringing, even if it is so-
cially desirable.8  Reasonable mistake, or even the subconscious nature 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 This should not be overstated.  “The law also allows non-owners to make more efficient 
uses of land over time through prescriptive easements, adverse possession, the establishment of 
hunting customs, etc., making clear that the delegation of land use decisions to individual owners 
comes with strings attached.”  E-mail from Gregg Macey, Visiting Assistant Professor, Fordham 
Univ. Sch. of Law, to Wendy J. Gordon (Apr. 22, 2009) (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary).  The law of real property can also be more generous to the public than is copyright.  See, 
e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote Address, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened (Feb. 25, 2005), in 55 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903, 907–08 (2005) (comparing copyright’s anticircumvention rules to state 
law governing private property that blocks access to public resources). 
 7 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  “The privileges to trespass have evolved over the years into a dis-
crete set of defined privileges.  But copyright law is newer, and ‘fair use’ [is] one doctrine 
. . . doing the work of many . . . .”  Wendy J. Gordon, Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: The 
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1391–92 
(1989) (footnote omitted).  The fair use defense cuts a swatch across several common law catego-
ries, embodying not only a version of the “necessity” privileges, but also privileges such as self-
defense.  See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that fair use treatment is warranted to allow “an individual to defend himself” against 
depictions in “a copyrighted work containing derogatory information” about him by allowing the 
individual to copy relevant parts of the work); see also Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009) (identifying several “policy clusters,” id. at 2546, representing 
separate fair use strands).   
  I am indebted to Professor Benjamin Zipursky for reminding me of this point and of the 
useful way that Professor Pamela Samuelson’s article addresses it. 
 8 As I have argued elsewhere, fair use should be favored for a socially desirable use that is 
unlikely to come into being through market purchase.  For example, when a use generates posi-
tive externalities that the putative licensee cannot capture, perhaps making him unable to afford a 
license, fair use should apply.  See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use].  It is a separate question whether in practice the com-
bination of the market, statutory exemptions, and fair use actually facilitates all socially desirable 
uses.  Many of us believe fair use needs to be more broadly interpreted than it is. 
  A note regarding my market failure model: Balganesh oddly asserts that, “[Gordon’s] model 
starts from the assumption that a creator’s incentive lies in unfettered control over all possible 
uses and that anything that detracts from such control is necessarily an interference with that in-
centive.”  Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1587.  It is true that my model starts with the statutory 
grants of control as a baseline, and that decision may be questionable.  But the statute hardly 
gives control over “all possible uses.”  The statute eliminates from authorial control all private 
performances, resale or rental of purchased copies, imitating the sound of a famous sound-
recording, and a myriad of other uses — including, of course, public use of facts and ideas in the 
copyrighted work and all uses that occur after a copyright expires.  Balganesh is hardly the only 
scholar to attack the notion that copyright gives owners rights to “all benefits,” but I do not know 
any judge or commentator who propounds the notion itself. 
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of the copying, is no excuse.9  A copyright or trespass plaintiff need not 
prove that the defendant’s trespass was socially undesirable or that it 
caused any harm, unlike in negligence, where the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant acted unreasonably, that these actions caused the 
plaintiff’s harm, and that the harm was foreseeable. 
 Balganesh suggests that the elements of the tort of copyright in-
fringement should change to require plaintiffs to prove foreseeability.  
But why?  Balganesh does not fully tell us.  His main point seems to 
be that, constitutionally and traditionally, incentives are key to copy-
right, and foreseeability tailors the cause of action to incentives.  I 
agree with both observations, but they do not get us all the way home.  
Yes, incentives are particularly important to copyright, but from an 
economic perspective, land ownership and copyright ownership are 
both incentive-based institutions.  Both land ownership and copyright 
can impose social costs when owners are enriched by surprising (un-
foreseeable) uses that they are ill-equipped to exploit.  So what makes 
copyright special?  Why diverge from the trespass-to-land model?10   
 Several answers are implicitly presented by Balganesh.  His pri-
mary answer seems to be this: When copyright enables monopoly pric-
ing, it imposes a deadweight loss that can be economically justified 
only when the deadweight loss is outweighed by positive incentive ef-
fects.  Giving a copyright owner control over a market that was objec-
tively unforeseeable to the author creates a windfall that is inefficient 
or unfair.  Foreseeability allows a court to restrict copyright to those 
occasions when the plaintiff might plausibly have been incentivized by 
the prospect of legal recovery.11  In his abstract, Balganesh writes that 
“creators… need to be given just enough incentive to create in order to 
balance the system’s benefits against its costs.”12  This answer is good, 
but partial.  Balganesh recommends a switch from a “rule utilitar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 Infringement also results if the defendant has copied unconsciously and in good faith be-
lieves her infringing production to be original with her.  See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. 
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“[I]nfringement of copyright . . . is 
no less so even though subconsciously accomplished.”).  On the dangers of the “subconscious copy-
ing” rule, see, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of 
Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1028–32 (1990). 
  Some strict liability aspects of the copyright tort are more defensible.  Under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(1), (3) (2006), a publisher will be liable for printing and selling a plagiarized story even if the 
publisher had received persuasive written assurances of originality, much as a careful employer is 
vicariously liable for employees’ carelessness.  In my view, the copyright statute collapses the pub-
lisher’s vicarious liability into the basic infringement tort, and I accept this as a desirable adminis-
trative convenience. 
 10 Thanks to Professor Keith Hylton for articulating a “market failure” formulation of the  
issue. 
 11 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1590. 
 12 Id. at 1571 (emphasis added). 
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ian”13 approach to an “act utilitarian” approach, and any such switch 
has costs.  It is possible that the administrative costs of individualized 
inquiry into foreseeability may be greater than the deadweight losses 
so avoided.14 
So we do not really know, absent extensive empirical inquiry, if 
more or less social product would be obtained through Balganesh’s 
approach than through copyright’s current approach.  And regarding 
the comparison with real property, land is notorious for generating in-
come in excess of what is needed to bring forth and maintain the prop-
erty (thus the notion of “rent”).  Balganesh’s argument sometimes 
seems motivated by a suspicion of windfalls; real property owners are 
the locus classicus of windfalls. 
But Balganesh is certainly headed in a fruitful direction, and no 
single article can do everything.  This Essay will supplement the an-
swers Balganesh supplies.  In so doing, it will make use of existing lit-
eratures and contribute one potentially novel point — namely, that the 
harm-benefit distinction has an impact on how the law should treat 
tangible versus intangible resources. 
First, let me remind the reader of a standard account of how tangi-
ble and intangible products differ.  This account begins by positing 
that the common law trusts that landowners’ self-interest prods them 
into making publicly acceptable decisions because, via the “invisible 
hand,” their private costs and benefits are made to match social costs 
and benefits.  That is, the law generally defers decisions about land 
use to individual landowners as mini-sovereigns, generally refusing to 
second-guess those private decisions and trusting that in following 
their self-interest the owners will unknowingly act as stewards of the 
public interest.15  Whether owners can indeed carry out this steward-
ship function in large part rests, of course, on whether their private in-
centives will mimic social costs and benefits.   
So we can reframe our initial question as follows: is there any rea-
son for the law to trust the “invisible hand” less when copyright own-
ers rather than land owners are at issue?  The literature suggests many 
such reasons.  For example, intangibles like works of authorship can 
be extensively shared without damage to the owners, which is not as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 Id. at 1582. 
 14 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1748 (2007) (arguing that “more direct” and “costly” “tailored 
solutions” should be compared with “simple on/off signals” like the right to exclude). 
 15 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 984 (2004) (“[T]his strong form of delegation of the ‘gatekeeper’ right to owners . . . makes 
sense on an information-cost theory: Judges and juries need not individuate and evaluate the rea-
sonableness or value of uses of the land.”).  See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089 (1972). 
 2009] COPYRIGHT AND THE HARM-BENEFIT DISTINCTION 67 
true of tangibles.  This nonrivalry means that, unlike land, a decentral-
ized use of copyrighted work is unlikely to result in tragedy of the 
commons and more likely to suffer from tragedy of the anticommons.16  
Further, use of a work by a myriad of different transformative artists 
will be (given the desirability of variation in new works17) highly bene-
ficial.  Moreover, a market can actually be destructive to certain pur-
suits.  After-the-fact requests for permission are subject to notorious 
sunk-cost problems.18  And attempts to avoid these problems can be 
even more costly.  Imagine that Bob Dylan’s lawyers interrupt him in 
the midst of creating a new song, and tell him to stop composing until 
he asks permission for a set of quotations he is embedding in his lyrics.  
The interruption could be fatal to the musical project.19 
Land and copyright invasions also differ in privacy costs.  Physical 
intrusions can easily disturb private activities; by contrast, a copy can 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 The tragedy of the commons (a concept originating with Garrett Hardin) refers to the waste 
and loss that can result when too little ownership or regulation leaves a resource prone to overuse 
and spoilation.  It is sometimes used as an argument to institute private ownership rights.  The 
tragedy of the anticommons refers to the waste and loss that can result from too much ownership, 
and is sometimes used as an argument to limit private ownership rights.  On ownership anticom-
mons, see MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP 
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 1–22 (2008); and Michael A. 
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).  Intangibles are probably more likely to be afflicted with 
the anticommons problem due to two phenomena: the frequently encountered difficulty of locat-
ing copyright owners (as compared with the extensive use of title registries for land and Article 9 
liens), and the numerous ways that a single use of an intangible might need to be licensed in order 
to be lawful.  To illustrate the latter point: Assume a movie maker wants to license a particular 
singer’s rendition of a popular song for use, with suitable modulation, as background music to a 
particularly dramatic moment in the story.  This use of the sound recording may constitute a “re-
production” and the “making of a derivative work” and/or “compilation,” and the movie when 
shown needs consent for the “public performance.”  In such a case, not only must the movie 
maker deal with two copyrights (one for the musical performance embodied in the sound re-
cording and the other for the underlying musical composition), but each of the sub-rights (analog 
or digital performance, reproduction, and so on) within each copyright may also be owned by un-
related entities.  
 17 Paul Goldstein’s copyright treatise sees the production of “variety” as a primary purpose of 
copyright.  See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 1 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.14.2, at 1:57 (3d ed. 2006 
& Supp. 2008) (noting copyright’s “general object of encouraging the production and dissemina-
tion of the widest possible variety of literary and artistic works desired by consumers”). 
 18 In copyright these are exacerbated by § 103(a), which provides that “protection for a work 
employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the 
work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”  17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  As expan-
sively interpreted by some courts, notably Judge Posner’s opinion in Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 
402 (7th Cir. 2000), § 103 can deprive a creative person who uses others’ work of any copyright — 
even in portions of his work that do not employ anyone else’s work — unless he obtains advance 
permission or has shelter in fair use. 
 19 It is partly for this reason that I have explored keeping copyright defendants free from li-
ability unless a copyright plaintiff can prove, inter alia, either that the defendant caused harm, or 
that the defendant is engaged in making licensing and other bureaucratic arrangements prior to 
and during the production process.  Gordon, Harmless Use, supra note 3, at 2414–35. 
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be made “a thousand miles from the owner and without his ever be-
coming aware of the wrong.”20  Further, the privacy of the home usu-
ally cuts against strong copyright enforcement, for it is within homes 
— on home computers and tape recordings and DVRs — where much 
unlicensed copying occurs.21 
Most importantly, when the owner of land is not managing it in a 
socially desirable way, that “error” often is corrected through the mar-
ket: if someone other than the owner is capable of making a more 
beneficial use of the land, she can probably also make more profit 
from it and will purchase or lease it.22  It can be harder for a market 
to correct “errors” in the allocation of speech than in the allocation of 
tangibles.  Most notably, the value of speech is rarely measurable in 
monetary terms.23    
For these and other reasons, copyright law’s fair use doctrine per-
mits judges and juries to decide whether a use of a copyrighted work 
is socially desirable or not, and the inquiry into whether a defendant’s 
work is “substantially similar” leaves much scope for fact-finder discre-
tion.  In ways like this, the law delegates less authority to copyright 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 20 White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurring 
specially).  Justice Holmes also wrote, “[Copyright] restrains the spontaneity of men where but for 
it there would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit.  It is a prohibition of 
conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the party having the right.”  Justice Holmes ar-
gued further that because of this intangibility, copyright “could not be recognized or endured for 
more than a limited time” and is therefore uniquely a “product of statute.”  Id. 
 21 Thus, the Supreme Court opinion in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417 (1984), repeats the word “home” about three dozen times in the course of holding 
VCR time-shifting to be fair use.  See, e.g., id. at 445; see also id. at 430 n.11. 
 22 Another reason for distrusting rules that centralize power in the copyright owner might be 
the difficulty of determining boundaries in ownership claims over intangibles.  See, e.g., Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).  But see Edmund 
W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977) (“[A] 
patent ‘prospect’ increases the efficiency with which investment in innovation can be man-
aged . . . [by] put[ting] the patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological 
and market enhancement of the patent’s value so that duplicative investments are not made and 
so that information is exchanged among the searchers.”).  Balganesh nicely discusses the limita-
tions of prospect theory.  Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1621–24. 
 23 In addition, many socially desirable uses of speech are critical of existing power holders, 
including copyright holders, and suffer from the welfare effect I’ve called “pricelessness.”  Wendy 
J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been 
Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 182–87 (2003); see also E. J. Mishan, The 
Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 18–19 (1971) (il-
lustrating welfare effects).  The courts tend to speak of authorial reluctance to license parodies; 
“welfare effects” provide a formal way of describing why such refusals to license are more suspect 
than ordinary refusals.  See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994); 
see also Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 8, at 1632–33 (describing antidissemination motives as a 
form of market failure). 
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owners than to real property owners.24  But it is recognized that even 
this lesser delegation may be too much. 
I’d like to add to the above-listed considerations an issue that I do 
not think the literature has previously addressed in a serious way — 
namely, the harm-benefit distinction.  Consider the following hypothe-
sis: People (including property owners) are less motivated to “capture 
benefits” than to avoid losing a possession.  Similarly, losing an oppor-
tunity to profit does not motivate action as strongly as avoiding harm.  
Intangibles are more open to harmless25 and beneficial use by strang-
ers than are tangibles such as land.  Therefore, owners of land and 
other tangibles are more reliable maximizers of the value of what they 
own than are owners of intangibles. 
Let me unpack the assumptions and conclusion of this hypothesis.  
First, consider my factual claim that people are not as good at captur-
ing benefits as they are at avoiding harms.  Loss aversion leads to sta-
tus quo bias and endowment effects, which are two phenomena com-
monly cited to show an “irrational” reluctance to sell the things one 
owns.26  Experiments in many Western nations show that people often 
value the things they are given — university coffee mugs are typical 
examples — more than identical things they would need to purchase.  
Such phenomena are often considered irrational.  Perhaps they arise 
out of our genetic heritage, perhaps out of a background set of beliefs 
about fate and the “hand one is dealt,” or perhaps out of a conditioned 
set of habits that serve us well in other circumstances.27  But in many 
circumstances the endowment effect is both rational and legitimate.  
Each of us is a tiny entity with a unique history; our sense of having a 
legitimacy of self in the face of the world’s immensity may depend in 
part on our keeping hold of some objects in our history.28 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Sonia K. Katyal & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property Outlaws II: The Anti-Delegation Archi-
tecture of Intellectual Property (Apr. 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library). 
 25 I am including in my implicit definition of “harmless” behavior any behavior by third par-
ties that does not interfere with an owner’s current and expected markets.  I think that is how the 
typical owner would view (or “frame”) the issue.  In contrast, an owner who conceptualized all 
potential licensing fees as already his might frame the lack of license fees as a harm.  On framing 
in general, see Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomolies: The Endow-
ment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197–99 (1991).   
  I am indebted to Professor Gregg Macey for this point. 
 26 Id. at 194. 
 27 Id. at 194–95 (recounting experimental redesign to determine whether “the discrepancy be-
tween buying and selling prices might be produced by the thoughtless application of normally 
sensible bargaining habits, namely understating one’s true willingness to pay (WTP) and overstat-
ing the minimum acceptable price at which one would sell (willingness to accept or WTA”)). 
 28 On the proposition that at least some “things” have special value, see Margaret Jane Radin, 
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).  See also ANNETTE B. WEINER, INAL-
IENABLE POSSESSIONS: THE PARADOX OF KEEPING-WHILE-GIVING (1992) (emphasizing 
the importance of artifacts that played a role in the history of a family or tribe). 
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Non-cash gifts have a special role in our sense of self.  If so, even a 
humble coffee mug with a school logo may possess more emotional 
weight as a souvenir if the mug is given rather than purchased.  So it 
is not surprising that we fear losing “our” objects more than we value 
gaining similar objects we do not own.  Similarly, I speculate, we will 
be more motivated to avoid harm to our objects than we will be to ob-
tain good prices for selling or leasing our objects, and more motivated 
to avoid harm from licensing our copyrights than we are to garner li-
cense fees from new uses. 
The biases documented by modern behavioral economics are not 
the whole story.  Which is lucky, since we cannot be sure how endow-
ment effects would play out when works of authorship are in question.  
On the one hand, endowment effects might be stronger for works of 
authorship than for other objects.  Just as things we buy may have 
lesser significance than things we are given, things we are given may 
have lesser significance for us than things we create.  That creative 
emotional stake might reinforce the endowment effect.  But on the 
other hand, an author can license or even assign away her copyright 
and still retain copies for her private use.  This retention of posses-
sion29 could undermine the endowment effect.30  How these two forces 
(and others) would play against each other is at this point unknown.31 
Since the way in which endowment effects will affect the licensing 
of intangibles is very uncertain, let me add what should be an uncon-
troversially “non-irrational” observation: The loss of something already 
embedded in our lives brings with it a host of follow-on costs.  And 
this is true whether or not we irrationally tend to hold on to our ob-
jects harder than we yearn for the objects we do not yet have.  A ra-
tional actor knows that losses are likely to impose more dislocation 
costs than are gains. 
Most of our preferences and activities are interdependent.  If my 
apartment burns, my whole life changes — in addition to the trauma I 
might experience, consider how work and family life will be inter-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 A copyright seller’s retention of copies need not interfere with a purchaser’s plans to exploit 
the copyright; this is known as nonrivalry.  In addition to physical nonrivalry, the structure of 
copyright law permits private retention of copies, as well as private display and private perform-
ance.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 30 In the text, I am speaking of the copyright owner as a creative person.  Separate examina-
tion would be needed for copyright intermediaries (such as publishing companies) and entities 
that own copyrights through work for hire arrangements.  In fact, one of the reasons our copy-
right law allows assignments and work-for-hire ownership may be to minimize the effect of crea-
tors' behavioral biases.   
  I am indebted to Professor Christopher Sprigman for this last point. 
 31 Chris Sprigman is currently engaged in experiments to test whether the endowment effect 
operates in “markets” for creative work.  See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman & Christopher Bucca-
fusco, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment (June 3, 2009) (unpublished abstract, on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library). 
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rupted as I attend to tasks like finding new housing or supervising 
contractors at my old abode; if I have to move, consider the cost of 
seeking new social and economic networks.  The loss of my home 
might alter my life in ways my life would not have been changed if the 
lottery gave me an apartment’s-worth of money.  The same is true 
even if the loss is voluntary.  To give up one apartment for a more 
cheerful one across town may not be as traumatic as being burned out, 
but I still have to take into account the dislocation and relocation 
costs.  Given the interrelated structure of our investments of emotion, 
effort, and physical resources, an injury or even mere disruption to one 
thing or person we value will have domino-like effects on many of our 
other interests, both compensable and noncompensable.   
Judge Guido Calabresi identified follow-on effects in the accident 
context and named them “secondary costs.”32 The “secondary cost” 
nomenclature, identifying costs that arise after and because of the im-
mediate loss, can be usefully expanded to the instant context as well.  
In part because of secondary costs, it can be rational to fear loss of an 
object more than we would desire to obtain that object.33  Therefore, 
whether copyright owners do or do not experience endowment ef-
fects,34 I think they will rationally be less eager to garner licensing rev-
enues (a benefit) than they will be to avoid harms (whether commercial 
harm such as loss of markets or emotional harm such as ridicule). 
But this may not be the case.  As Adam Smith famously noted, 
many humans are overly optimistic about their chances for success.35  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 32 Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 27–28 (1970).  The “primary cost” of an ac-
cident includes immediate injuries such as the breaking of a leg; the “secondary cost” comes later 
— for example, that the leg might be lost if medical attention is not promptly sought.  
 33 We could quibble over definitions here.  If the danger being anticipated does not include the 
secondary costs of disruption, then it is rational to be more averse to the risk of loss than a mere 
numeric calculation would suggest.  But if the cost of the danger being anticipated is set at an 
amount that does include the secondary effects, then it is arguably irrational to spend more on 
averting the risk than would be suggested by a numeric calculation of danger multiplied by prob-
ability.  People and institutions sometimes do and sometimes do not include the kind of conse-
quential economic and emotional damage that a loss imposes.  Consider, for example, that the in-
surance on a condominium or house includes some significant disruption expenses (such as rent on 
alternative housing) but not others (such as disruption to work and school performance, or the 
trauma itself). 
 34 Loss aversion and status quo bias, those supposed irrationalities, might be conditioned (inter 
alia) by continual exposure to the extra and often hidden costs imposed by change, particularly 
change in the form of loss. 
 35 Adam Smith argued: “The chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued, and the 
chance of loss is by most men under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health 
and spirits, valued more than it is worth.”  1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE 
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 124 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1994) 
(1776).  Nevertheless, loss aversion still seems to me the more prevalent.  In any event, of course, 
this whole set of issues calls for more factual investigation. 
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Such an overconfidence bias could have a variety of effects.  On the 
one hand, overconfidence could counteract both irrational loss aver-
sion and rational assessment of secondary costs,36 thus minimizing the 
differentiating effect that nonrivalry might otherwise have in making 
copyright owners less sensitive to licensing opportunities than land-
owners.  On the other hand, overconfidence can lead to owners de-
manding excessively high prices.  Such an effect could reinforce an 
undesirably low level of licensing for copyrights, particularly if authors 
are more prone to overconfidence than other owners because of their 
personal connection with the item being sold.37 
I raise the question of how the overconfidence bias interacts with 
other behavioral traits in part to illustrate that my judgments here 
really constitute a call for further empirical investigation.  Not only 
are my judgments somewhat speculative when I compare how owners 
of tangibles and intangibles would react to licensing opportunities, but 
in addition my judgment that  fear of loss predominates for copyright 
is open to factual dispute.  Nevertheless, let me summarize. 
If the non-Coasean38 observation is accurate that people fear loss 
more than they desire gain, this gives us the first premise of a syllo-
gism: an owner will respond less readily to opportunities to maximize 
the beneficial use of her property than she will to opportunities for 
avoiding harms to it.  Although some tangible property can be harm-
lessly shared,39 intangibles (such as the patterns that make up “works 
of authorship”) are much more likely than tangibles to be nonrival and 
inexhaustible.  This leads us to a second premise: that copyright is 
more likely than real property to involve harmless but beneficial uses 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  I thank Shyamkrishna Balganesh for reminding me of the behavioral research pointing to 
overestimation of one’s likelihood of success and Gregg Macey for reminding me how overconfi-
dence can derail negotiations. 
 36 Conceivably, overoptimism could overcome loss aversion.  For example, if a person hates 
out-of-pocket costs (losses) thirty percent more than he or she hates bearing opportunity costs  
(foregone gains) — but he or she underestimates the odds of loss occurring by 30 percent or over-
estimates the gain by 30 per cent — the result may be the same as if the person had no loss  
aversion. 
 37 See Jeffrey L. Rachlinksi, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1165, 1193–95 (2003) (“Inventors arguably spend so much energy on their products and fo-
cus so intently on their benefits, that self-serving biases ensure that they overvalue their innova-
tions.  Consequently, inventors and designers might demand too much to license their inventions 
and defend their rights too vigorously.”). 
 38 Nobel laureate Ronald Coase assumed symmetry between out-of-pocket cost and opportu-
nity cost as part of his classic demonstration of the importance of transaction costs.  See R.H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).  For one critique of this assumption, 
see, for example, Gordon, supra note 23, at 178–87.  I argue that welfare effects and endowment 
effects may be rare in most markets, but are much more common in markets for speech and  
expression. 
 39 I am indebted to Professor Stan Liebowitz for showing how durable goods can exhibit some 
of the same nonrivalries that one sees in intangible goods. 
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by third parties.  If the preceding two premises are accurate, then this 
conclusion may follow: since owners are likely to be more vigilant in 
avoiding harms than in pursuing benefits, and since nonharmful bene-
fits are more likely to occur in the case of intangibles, copyright own-
ers are less likely to maximize the social value of their property than 
are the owners of tangible property. 
This quasi-syllogism suggests that it is far less clear that the market 
can “correct for” the misallocation of rights to control artistic works 
than the misallocation of rights to control real property.  Without the 
prospect of a “harm” to call attention to a competing use, and without 
the definiteness of measurement that “harms” can provide to real 
property owners, copyright owners might be less prone than tangible 
property owners to engage in privately and socially valuable licensing.  
When this reluctance is coupled with the effects of nonrivalry, and 
with the probability that a larger range of potential uses exist for a 
valuable piece of copyrighted material than for a valuable piece of 
land, it seems likely that copyright owners, left to the private market, 
will license a narrower range of their property’s potential uses than 
will the owners of realty.  Further, authors’ emotional investment in 
their work may make them (if they own the copyrights) prone to over-
estimating the value of their work, setting unrealistically high prices 
that derail bargaining. 
There are yet additional reasons for doubting the propriety of rely-
ing on copyright owners to take the proper course in licensing and giv-
ing permissions.40  Here I will turn from efficiency to fairness.  Copy-
right owners have often created a relationship between their works 
and the defendant copyists.  The copyright owners have affected how 
the public — including the copyists — conduct their lives.41  The re-
sulting disparity can make us feel that the owners have forfeited some 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 As already mentioned, copyright boundaries are less clearly marked than are land bounda-
ries; owners of land are more easily found than owners of copyrighted works; and opportunity 
costs are often underestimated and risks overestimated.  See Fromer, supra note 22; see also 
Smith, supra note 14. 
 41 At the extreme, this can be articulated as a form of addiction, to which the public should 
have a liberty of self-defense.  See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equal-
ity and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1567–69 
(1993) (using an addiction analogy in the context of Lockean analysis to show how inventions and 
works of authorship can affect their audiences).  On a level less than addiction, use of others’ 
copyrighted works can become a form of self-realization.  Consider, for example, that many cou-
ples adopt a popular piece of music as “their song.”  Then imagine the reaction of one such couple 
if the owners of the copyright in the song demanded exorbitant sums from the couple for the lib-
erty of having the song played at their wedding.  Fairness reasons might partly explain current 
doctrine — such as fair use, or the rule that private performances are not subject to a copyright 
owner's control — but if thoroughly embraced would result in more liberties for more users than 
copyright law currently recognizes.  Id. at 1535–39, 1601–08. 
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of their rights of control.42  Even the Supreme Court has intimated 
that when copyrighted works are sent out to the public, some kind of 
estoppel might be applicable against copyright owners’ attempts to 
control how the widely disseminated material is used.43 
II.  EVALUATING THE BALGANESH PROPOSAL 
So perhaps the reader is persuaded that the strict liability, trespass-
type model is not as well adapted to copyright as it might be to land.  
The question still remains whether Balganesh’s proposed solution is 
the best one.  It is vibrantly argued and well-researched, but there are 
several problems with it. 
First, of course, are problems of administrability.  These issues are 
so salient that this brief Essay need only flag them for now.44  Foresee-
ability is going to be difficult to prove.45  As Professor Peter Menell 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 82–83 (2004) (explaining that public reliance on widely disseminated cul-
tural items may make it inequitable for copyright owners to have full unilateral freedom to with-
draw items from use).  For a similar argument in the land use context, see Joseph William Singer, 
The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). 
 43  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984) 
(“[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work and that time-
shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its 
entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced does not have its ordinary effect 
of militating against a finding of fair use.” (citations omitted)). 
 44 Oddly, Balganesh claims I “reject[ed]” foreseeability in my own first try at drafting an un-
fair-competition tort.  See Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1603 (commenting on Gordon, Restitution-
ary Impulse, supra note 3, at 238 & n.337).  Balganesh is quite right that I thought foreseeability 
likely to present “intractable proof problems.”  Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1603 (quoting Gordon, 
Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 3, at 238).  But instead of rejecting foreseeability, I offered a 
proxy for it, namely, expected markets.  See Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 3, at 229–
40 (discussing foreseeability at length and reasons for choosing a proxy); see also id. at 238–39 
(“Though perhaps desirable in the abstract, the foreseeability approach might encounter intracta-
ble proof problems.  In addition, a creator’s expectations in part may be a function of the law it-
self.  As a proxy for this inquiry, the approach suggested here asks whether the plaintiff now 
stands ready and willing to supply the market served by the defendant’s use.  If the plaintiff can 
show she is serving, or shortly will be serving, the defendant’s customers, she will have presented 
an acceptable proof of connection between the plaintiff and the contested use.” (footnote omitted)). 
  Thus, I use a proxy for foreseeability, and Balganesh in his turn does the converse: he says 
that “[f]oreseeable copying would thus function as an objective proxy for a creator’s anticipated 
markets.”  Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1607.  So I do not see us as very far apart —  except re-
garding our degrees of certainty. 
  The article in which Balganesh claims that I reject foreseeability in copyright does not have 
copyright as its focus; instead, the topic is unjust enrichment and the common law tort of misap-
propriation.  In copyright, the issues of institutional allocation (legislature versus judiciary), rules 
versus standards, and burden of proof (if social desirability is to be made a case-by-case criterion, 
should the law require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s copying is socially undesirable, 
or should the defendant have to prove the opposite?) have additional depths not addressed in that 
article. 
 45 Balganesh examines this issue, noting among other things that trade journals and the like 
can assist in providing proof and that the person wanting copyright can establish a public record 
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has noted,46 copyright and patent help create the infrastructure within 
which industries like publishing suspend themselves.  Introduce 
enough uncertainty — such as keeping everyone in the dark on the 
question of whether copyright extends to a particular new technology 
until such time as the technology is well established (or until such time 
as some copyright owner proves foreseeability)47 — and the result 
might erode the infrastructure more than the change is worth.48 
Second, there is Balganesh’s unexplained departure from the negli-
gence model in several respects.  For example, he does not allow a 
plaintiff’s special knowledge to count in assessing what is foreseeable.  
In determining negligence, by contrast, the defendant with more 
knowledge than the average person is held to “foresee” what a reason-
able person with that knowledge could foresee.  The Balganesh ap-
proach would mean that a creative person who takes the trouble of 
learning about technological trends unknown to the general public (or 
who has the happy accident of hearing about them) and who creates 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(or perhaps a private record under a special administrative arrangement).  Balganesh, supra note 
1, at 1624–25.  Yet the imputation of “objective” knowledge about technological change raises 
special problems in the copyright arena, given that (computer programs aside) we are asking what 
a nontechnical reasonable creative person would know about technological matters.  I am in-
debted for this point to Gregg Macey, who uses Balganesh’s own example to illustrate:  
 For example, JK writes a book in 1970 which is later used to produce a film and 
computer game.  The movie infringes because motion picture technology was around in 
1970.  The video game version allegedly does not infringe because the technology was 
not anticipated: “the market for video gaming and the technology on which it relies were  
neither in existence nor anticipated in 1970, and a court is likely to conclude that G’s ac-
tions were unforeseeable in form and purpose.”  How does the court actually get to that 
point?  There was a patent filed for a video game in 1947.  U.S. Patent No. 2,455,992 
(filed Jan. 25, 1947).  There were public disclosures of video games in the 1950s.  And by 
the early 60’s, MIT students had already created a space battle game involving two 
players and multiple tasks.  What do we expect a Creative PHOSITA (person having 
ordinary skill in the art) to know?  At what level of awareness, whether actual or im-
puted from the general state of knowledge, do we label the use of JK’s novel as a video 
game foreseeable? 
Email from Gregg Macey to Wendy J. Gordon, supra note 6 (referring to Balganesh, supra note 1, 
at 1614). 
 46 Conversation with Peter Menell, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Sch. of Law, in 
Boston, Mass. (Apr. 4, 2009). 
 47 In this regard, collusive suits might be a more salient danger than in other areas of litiga-
tion.  Douglas Baird teaches us that in the classic case of International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) — a set of Supreme Court opinions studied by all students of 
copyright or patent — both parties had an affirmative stake in establishing quasi-property rights 
in news.  Douglas G. Baird, The Story of INS v. AP: Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy 
Legacy of a Concocted Controversy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 9, 9–35 (Jane C. 
Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006). 
 48 I am quite aware that my own thought experiment — requiring plaintiffs to prove either 
harm or a limited set of alternatives, see Gordon, Harmless Use, supra note 3 — runs into the 
same objection.  In fact, Menell raised the point in the context of discussing my proposal.  Con-
versation with Peter Menell, supra note 46.  At least tentatively, however, I think the problems 
that a foreseeability test poses are even greater than those posed by a harm test. 
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works of authorship for the coming new market, will be barred from 
profiting from those works unless he (or someone) undertakes the addi-
tional task of publicizing the coming technology.49 
Third, if foreseeability is the measure, it is odd to choose as the 
time for assessing foreseeability the moment of a given work’s crea-
tion.  Incentives are most needed not then, but at the same time when 
the author is commencing her apprenticeship.  That is when the heavy 
investment of time and money is made and when the big decision is 
made to step out of the normal path of commerce.  Some artists are 
lucky enough to be trained creatively in college as we are in law 
schools.  But for most, an inescapable price is years of writing dis-
carded drafts or painting discarded pictures, perhaps coupled with an 
MFA program.  When we audience members encounter finished 
works, their grace and apparent ease of expression makes us forget 
how difficult it is to make creative work look easy, and how long and 
onerous the apprenticeship can be.  The point at which the authors 
and artists most need encouragement is when they are deciding to in-
vest the preparatory time.  And once that investment is made, they 
may have few choices but to pursue their craft. 
Yet if foreseeability is measured from that crucial time when the 
decision is being made to invest in training one’s self, that is an early 
point in time — a point at which the “reasonable artist” could foresee 
fewer markets and uses than will be foreseeable at the time of creating 
mature works.  So the foreseeability test seems to be caught in a di-
lemma: either the point in time is too early to embrace as many future 
uses as it should, or the point in time is somewhat arbitrarily related to 
the real need for incentives. 
That conundrum leads to my most substantive disagreement with 
Balganesh’s position.  In my view, the crucial thing to safeguard is  
the young artist’s belief that if he works hard and perfects his craft, 
and if he produces something the public wants, he will have a decent 
standard of living.  Accordingly, I would give priority to giving the au-
thor a way to share in the revenue from new technological uses that 
supplant the markets the author intended to reach.  That is, authors 
need protection from new technologies that cannibalize their existing 
markets. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 49 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1624–25 (arguing that special knowledge must be made public).  
It is not impossible that creative persons who work for large corporate employers will be made 
cognizant of new technologies, and that the employers will publicize the technologies.  But of 
course, the employers may want instead to keep their “advantage” a secret.  As Balganesh notes, 
and as the interrelated fields of patent and trade secrecy law demonstrate, it can be quite difficult 
to calibrate the legal and social institutions needed to encourage disclosure of difficult-to-obtain 
information.  Id. at 1625 n.213.  In any event, this task of publicizing a technological advance is 
one that most writers, composers and visual artists will be ill-equipped to undertake. 
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Balganesh, as I understand him, gives no independent weight to 
destruction of expected markets.  He relies on an abstract argument 
that “markets for unforeseeable uses . . . are likely to derive largely 
from the creation of new demand rather than from cannibalizing exis-
tent demand.”50  He refuses to give any independent weight to “con-
cern with substitutability.”51  The importance of substitution to author-
ial incentives lies behind my own suggestion that copyright require 
copyright owners to prove harm (instead of foreseeability) as a prereq-
uisite to recovery in many instances.52 
Now to a last point.  In Balganesh’s view, copyright as it is prac-
ticed is “devoid of any connection to incentives and the probability dis-
tribution that is central to them.”53  He maintains this position despite 
his own admission that fair use purports to be centrally concerned 
with incentives.  Copyright has many problems (in particular its ab-
surdly long duration), but I think Balganesh is depicting the current 
system as more inimical to cultural growth than it really is. 
Balganesh’s attempt to prove the copyright system’s disdain for in-
centives takes many forms.  One is his discussion of Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,54 where a news magazine pub-
lished a summary of President Ford’s memoirs (plus some direct quo-
tations) immediately prior to the publication of authorized excerpts 
and shortly before the book itself was to be published.  I remain mysti-
fied why Balganesh thinks the Court’s discussion of incentives in 
Harper is a mere “rhetorical framework.”55  Rather, the Court gave a 
victory to President Ford’s publisher on grounds of “expectations” and 
“incentives” that sound sincere: 
  [The alleged infringers’] theory . . . would expand fair use to effec-
tively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a 
public figure.  Absent such protection, there would be little incentive to 
create or profit in financing such memoirs, and the public would be denied 
an important source of significant historical information.  The promise of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 See Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1608–09.  He continues to say that the above assumption 
“thereby allow[s] the concern with substitutability to be given some salience in the entitlement 
structuring process.”  Id. at 1609.  Lest the reader misunderstand, Balganesh goes on: “To give the 
concern with substitutability any more significance than this (for example, by attempting to con-
trol for all substitutes, not just foreseeable ones) would collapse the system back into its current 
state, devoid of any connection to incentives and the probability distribution that is central to 
them.” Id. 
 51 Id. at 1609. 
 52 See Gordon, Harmless Use, supra note 3.  In instances where the suit is brought to clarify 
ownership issues, or to restrain a revenue-generating use of the plaintiff’s work in bureaucratic 
contexts, I suggest the plaintiff not be required to prove harm.  Id. at 2432–33. 
 53 Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1609.  Versions of this assertion appear often in the piece. 
 54 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 55  Balganesh, supra note 1, at 1580. 
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copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by dubbing 
the infringement a fair use “news report” of the book.56  
The language from the Supreme Court, with its focus on “expectation 
of copyright protection” and “incentive” could almost be quoting from 
Balganesh. 
To determine whether this is mere rhetoric, let us examine the 
Court’s reasoning.  The Court was rejecting the defendant’s theory 
that a quotation from a public figure could be fair use on the ground 
that the expression itself could count as “news.”57  One can see why the 
defendant’s theory might frighten a Court concerned with incentives.  
Copyright law gives no protection to “facts,”58 and when expression 
(whether verbal or visual) is repeated as evidence of what was said or 
done, the expression is serving as a “fact.”  This could be taken to sug-
gest that no factual use of expression should count as infringement.  If 
such a broad rule were adopted, then arguably one could freely repub-
lish President Ford’s memoirs, or Stephen King’s latest novel, so long 
as the copyist wrote a “cover essay” to which the copied work served 
as an evidentiary appendix.  So I can see how the Court might have 
jumped to copyright Armageddon from the notion of giving fair use 
deference to copying expression used as “news.” 
However, there are limits possible even if one admits that “factual 
uses” deserve some deference — limits that the Court may not have 
seen.  In essence, the Court seems to have perceived a bottomless cre-
vasse where I see a slope that’s somewhat slippery but far from fric-
tionless.  The Court ironically seems to have ignored the interplay be-
tween different kinds of “fairness,” including fairness arising out of 
expectation and foreseeability. 
To illustrate the way in which fairness and foreseeable incentives 
interplay, making “factual fair use” less dangerous, consider Núñez v. 
Caribbean International News Corp.59  In that case a newspaper re-
printed a copyrighted photograph of an unclothed Miss Puerto Rico 
supposedly to help the public make up its own mind about whether 
the photograph was so explicit that the young lady should be prohib-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557 (citing Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 
558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 57 See id. 
 58 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–64 (1991).  The distinction be-
tween “expressive use” of a creative work, and “factual use” of that same work, is similar to the 
difference between hearsay and nonhearsay: whether an expression repeated for the sake of its 
truth value versus one that is repeated merely to prove that the utterance had been said.  It is not 
surprising that the Supreme Court has difficulty with the notion that expression can be factual, 
given its ontological “holding” in Feist that facts are only discovered and not “made.”  See Wendy 
J. Gordon, Reality As Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, 
at 93, 100–04 [hereinafter Gordon, Reality As Artifact]. 
 59 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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ited from participating in beauty contests.  Thus, the newspaper plau-
sibly claimed that at least one of its purposes was to employ the pho-
tograph as a newsworthy fact.60  But standing alone, the factual use 
might not have been sufficient to obtain fair use treatment for the 
newspaper.  The court also found it highly relevant that the photogra-
pher Núñez had no expectation that he would be paid for copies of the 
photo.  The photographer knew that the beauty contestant planned to 
distribute copies for free as part of her publicity.61  Thus, in practice, 
the court’s use of what I call the “factual use” doctrine62 was informed 
by considerations of expectation and foreseeability. 
Of the lower court cases, Núñez is the most colorful.  On a more 
quotidian basis, courts regularly find that litigants have a fair use pri-
vilege to reproduce copyrighted works to use as exhibits in litigation.63  
Appending a copyrighted business letter to a complaint or requesting 
its production in litigation discovery will not impair the kinds of incen-
tives that concern the federal Copyright Act.  Accordingly, “fair use for 
factual use” need have few limits there.  So in my view, fair use for fac-
tual uses is capable of being employed where appropriate and cabined 
when dangerous.64  The Harper & Row Court seems to have made an 
honest error arising out of a sincere concern with incentives.  Fair 
use’s concern with incentives is not mere rhetoric. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 60 The Núñez court wrote:  
Appellee [news corporation] reprinted the pictures not just to entice the buying public, 
but to place its news articles in context; as the district court pointed out, “the pictures 
were the story.”  It would have been much more difficult to explain the controversy 
without reproducing the photographs.  And although such an explanatory need does not 
always result in a fair use finding, it weighs in the favor of appellee. 
Id. at 22 (citation omitted). 
 61 Id. at 24.  Moreover, the court noted that: “Núñez had not sought to control further dis-
semination during his limited distribution: he had not registered the copyright prior to publication 
in El Vocero, required recipients to sign non-disclosure or no-resale agreements, or even sought 
oral promises from recipients not to redistribute the photographs.”  Id. 
 62 I am not sure the practice of deferring to defendants’ factual uses has ever been labeled as a 
“doctrine” before; if so let me christen it.  One of the doctrine’s origins can be found in Gordon, 
Reality as Artifact, supra note 58, in which I argue that the factual use of copyrighted works 
should be privileged under the fair use doctrine.  See also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[B][1] (2007) (arguing that changing the purpose of 
a copyrighted work should assist the defendant in fair use cases). 
 63 See, e.g., Tavory v. NTP, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538–39 (E.D. Va. 2007); see also 4 NIM-
MER & NIMMER, supra note 62, at § 13.05[D][2]. 
 64 Doctrinally, factual fair use can be seen as falling within the first factor in the fair use in-
quiry under § 107, which considers the “purpose and character of the use.”  17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006).  See also A.V. ex rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, Nos. 08-1424, 08-1480, 2009 WL 
1015145, at *5–6 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2009) (describing how transformative factual use can qualify 
under the purpose and character factor).  In my view, a defendant’s factual use deserves far more 
fair use deference than it now receives.  It may be that liability for factual uses should be imposed 
only very rarely, perhaps limited only to occasions where the “factual” nature of the use is merely 
a pretext to cover copying that seeks to capitalize on the original, expressive purposes of the work. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
Young scholars are always caught between the conflicting demands 
of respecting tradition and forging their own course.  Balganesh has 
traversed these conflicting emotional demands in an interesting way; 
he situates himself securely in tort and contract traditions of “foresee-
ability” in order to challenge copyright.  Though he has not upended 
copyright’s strict liability approach — no one scholar standing alone 
could do so — he has given us a banquet for thought, and, along with 
others exploring the limits of the trespass-to-land model, has helped to 
place conditional models for copyright even more securely on the pub-
lic agenda.  I hope the urge to investigate conditional copyright will be 
further reinforced by this Essay’s contribution: introducing the possi-
bility that the harm-benefit distinction will have differing behavioral 
implications for tangible as compared with intangible ownership. 
